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MAIN
These
state regulations cover intrastate oil and natural gas pipelines
in Arizona.
Association
of Oil Pipe Lines,
Beyond Compliance: Creating a Responsible Regulatory Environment
that Promotes Excellence, Innovation, and Efficiency (1999)
http://www.aopl.org/pubs/misc/RiskDemoProgress.pdf
This
49-page AOPL report presents the industry's case that the
Risk Management Demonstration Program pilot project was
a successful experiment in self-regulation by oil and natural
gas pipeline companies. Despite these claims, the program
provides too little guidance to companies, has little idea
of what risks are greatest (because of poor OPS data), and
has no real way of knowing which companies have superior
accident histories over others. Pipeline companies support
the program because they can avoid meeting even lax OPS
standards and thus save maintenance and safety expenses.
City
of Bellingham WA
Safety
Agreement with Olympic Pipeline Co. (1999) - http://www.cob.org/pipeline/sept6press.htm
and http://www.cob.org/pipeline/master907.htm
This
press release outlining related documents and the master
agreement are models for what a determined local government
can accomplish if it persists and join forces with state
government and Congressional leaders. In the wake of the
tragic 1999 Olympic Pipeline explosion that killed three
children, the city was able to gain a voluntary agreement
on inspections, tests, repairs and improvements of the
pipeline before Olympic would restart operations. Previous
attempts by other local governments to obtain similar
safeguards after a pipeline disaster were denied by courts
when the companies obtained injunctions by courts upholding
federal preemption of interstate pipeline regulation.
Franchise
Agreement with Olympic Pipeline Co. (2001) - http://www.cob.org/web/LEGILOG.nsf/cfc339c6d029f19d882566c
7006b12f7/3950b87a52e3323388256afd006a6114/$FILE/0111081.pdf
This
franchise agreement was negotiated after the tragic 1999
pipeline explosion to grant Olympic the right to operate
on city streets and other properties for 10 years, renewable
for another 10 later. It includes stringent requirements
for Olympic to meet, including reports of safety conditions
and results of integrity other tests, emergency response
procedures, mandatory reports to the city in case of a
spill over 420 gallons, referring disputes to mediation,
indemnification of the city for any future liabilities
in case of a pipeline accident, and an annual franchise
fee of $50,000. Again, it shows what a determined local
government can accomplish.
City
of Friendswood TX,
Pipeline Safety in America (1996) - 00121
Confronted
by a proposed conversion of a crude oil pipeline into a
highly-volatile ethane pipeline, the city prepared this
brief report on pipeline standards and regulations and found
them wanting.
Friends
of Lloyd (FL),
Proposed Pipeline Regulation Ordinance for Jefferson County
FL (1993) - 00105
Opponents
to a proposed Colonial Pipeline route in this north Florida
county petitioned the county commission to adopt this ordinance
to protect rights-of-way from encroachment, enforce one-call
system procedures, discourage co-location of linear facilities,
clear-cutting rights-of-way, and 150-foot setback of new
buildings for human occupants from pipelines. Colonial and
the county commission opposed the ordinance, and it was
never adopted.
Georgia
Public Service Commission,
Chapter 15-9-1, Safe Installation and Operation of Natural
Gas Transmission and Distribution Systems (2002) - http://www.psc.state.ga.us/utilityrules/chapters/515-9-1.htm
These
are the basic state administrative rules regulating natural
gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas facilities in Georgia.
Illinois
Commerce Commission
Documents
on Pipeline Safety (2003) - http://www.icc.state.il.us/ps/library.aspx?key=Pipeline%20Safety
This
is an online index of state natural gas pipeline safety
statutes and administrative rules in Illinois, plus the
commission's pipeline safety newsletter.
Order
Denying Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
to Lakehead Pipe Line Company (1997) - 00104
This
was a remarkable victory for communities in the path of
a proposed new Lakehead Pipeline crude oil pipeline west
of Chicago. In seeking the required Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, Lakehead asserted that Illinois
refineries needed the Canadian crude oil it would supply,
and that would benefit consumers and businesses ‚ despite
the eight pipelines already in service. Communities Against
the Pipeline and the ICC staff opposed the petition, and
the commission agreed, turning down the petition.
Illinois
Appellate Court, Third District,
Opinion Affirming Illinois Commerce Commission's Denial
of Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Lakehead
Pipe Line Company (1998) - 00107
This
court ruling affirmed the ICC decision turning down Lakehead's
petition and provides good reasons why state and local governments
do not need to accede to a pipeline company's project if
it serves only competitive purposes and not the public purpose.
State
of Minnesota
Statutes,
Chapter 299J Pipeline Safety (2002) - http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/299J/
These
statutes authorize the Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety
to regulate intrastate and interstate oil and natural
gas pipelines in the state. Enacted in the late 1980s,
the current pipeline safety program was a response to
the tragic Mounds View MN gasoline pipeline explosion
in 1986.
Rules,
Chapter 7530 Pipeline Safety Enforcement and Sanctions
(1997) - http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/arule/7530/
These
are the administrative rules that implement Minnesota's
pipeline safety statutes.
Municipal
Services Center of Washington,
Pipeline Safety Information for Local Governments (2002)
http://mrsc.org/pubsafe/pipesafety.htm
This
is a useful summary and index to pipeline safety regulation
in the state, including online links to regulation in other
states and Canada.
National
League of Cities,
Amendment to National Municipal Policy Regarding Pipeline
Safety (1997) - 00116
Proposed
by the City of Fredericksburg VA and adopted by the NLC,
this amendment to the organization's policies on Water Quality
and Supply states that oil pipelines are a threat to municipal
water supplies, the federal government should adopt strict
regulations, take strong enforcement action, and involve
local governments more.
New
Mexico Public Regulation Commission,
Pipeline Safety Rules (2002) - http://www.nmprc.state.nm.us/pipeline.htm
This
includes the text of the state's regulations governing intrastate
oil and natural gas pipelines, as well as basic information
about the Bureau of Pipeline Safety that enforces these
regulations.
James
M. Pates, City of Fredericksburg VA,
Out of Sight, Out of Mind: What Every Local Government
Should Know About Pipeline Safety (1996) - 00103
Delivered
to the International Municipal Attorneys Association, this
paper describes the problem of oil and natural gas pipeline
accidents, the federal regulatory framework, federal case
law, the post-accident experience of three local governments,
and recommendations for actions that local governments can
take, including a national task force to draft model local
ordinances and to demand reforms to the federal Pipeline
Safety Act.
Oil
& Gas Journal
National
Pipeline Map for U.S. Being Developed (1997) - 00064i
From
its creation, the federal pipeline safety program has
never had comprehensive maps of the oil and natural gas
pipeline systems it regulates. In fact, OPS rejected numerous
recommendations that it require operators to furnish it
with such maps. This article describes the half-hearted
beginning of a mapping program that is voluntary, had
limited participation, and has yield incomplete results
to date. Even Congress finally lost patience and in 2002
required OPS to gather pipeline maps in a uniform GIS
format. In a few years, OPS may know where its regulated
pipelines are.
U.S.
Industry, Government Efforts Seek to Improve Pipeline Safety
(1995) ‚ 00064h
This
technical paper describes the early efforts by the pipeline
industry to reduce regulations and enforcement, and the
enthusiastic cooperation of OPS in doing this, primarily
by developing a risk management program. Unfortunately,
both industry and OPS have still not grasped the real
risks and risk factors for the nation's pipeline system
because of the lack of comprehensive historical data about
accidents and their causes and consequences.
Canadian
Design Codes Differ for Work on Cased Crossings (1994)
- 00064f
This
technical paper discusses regulatory design codes for
the problem of corrosion of pipelines inside casings to
protect them from outside force damage at road and rail
crossings. Although separated from the casings by spacers,
the pipes can still come in contact with the casing, causing
an electrical short of cathodic protection systems meant
to prevent external corrosion.
Pipe
Line & Gas Industry,
States on the Move (2001) - http://www.pipe-line.com/archive/archive_01-07/01-07_safety.html
This
column in a now-defunct trade journal is a good summary
of pipeline safety regulatory improvements in Washington,
New Mexico and Texas. The author states, "This increased
activity is evidence that the public is becoming more aware
of pipeline safety."
Seattle
(WA) Times,
Cities, Counties Seek Stricter Safety Agreements for Pipelines
(1999) - http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin
/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=fran&date=19990822
and http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin
/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=stat&date=19990822
These
two articles describe the decisive action taken by local
governments in Washington state to protect the public from
pipeline accidents after the tragic Bellingham WA Olympic
Pipeline explosion in 1999.
U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Yellowstone Pipeline Easement Renewal: Final Environmental
Impact Statement (1995) - 00138
This
environmental impact statement is about a controversial
Yellowstone Pipeline reconnect project through the Flathead
Indian Reservation in western Montana that continues to
be held up by opponents. The controversy began in 1995,
when the tribal government refused to renew Yellowstone's
lease to cross its lands because of the company's numerous
spills there and failure to clean them up, forcing Yellowstone
to offload fuel onto rail cars to bridge the gap. This EIS
is notable for two reasons. First, almost no proposed new
natural gas or oil pipeline ever undergoes such a thorough
environmental review. Second, the opponents succeeded.
U.S.
Code,
Pipeline Safety Act, U.S. Code 49 Subtitle VIII
Chapter 601 Sections 60101- 60128 (2002) - http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/49/stVIIIch601.html
This
is the basic governing statute for both oil (hazardous liquids)
and natural gas pipeline safety. It automatically expires
("sunsets") every four years, so that reauthorization
legislation is debated once every four years and often results
in significant changes, both good and otherwise.
U.S.
Congressional Research Service,
CRS Report for Congress ‚ Pipeline Safety: Federal Program
and Reauthorization Issues (2002) - http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/energy/eng-66.pdf
This
six-page briefing paper summarized key issues in pipeline
safety. It is a useful primer for readers learning about
this key legislation.
U.S.
General Accounting Office
Pipeline
Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication
Needed (2002) - http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02785.pdf
This
report is basically a management review of OPS, comparing
its ambitious initiatives with its available staff, and
finds that better workforce planning will be needed to
accomplish its goals. It also identifies the need to communicate
better with state pipeline safety agencies. Noteworthy
is GAO's criticism of OPS accident and safety performance
data, along with descriptions of what OPS is doing to
correct that neglected problem.
Pipeline
Safety: Status of Improving Oversight of the Pipeline Industry
(2002) - http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi
?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=
d02517t.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao
This
report is in the form of written testimony at a House
committee hearing on reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety
Act. It notes progress in several areas, but voices concern
about OPS's slow pace in implementing NTSB safety recommendations
and statutory mandates.
Pipeline
Safety: The Office of Pipeline Safety is Changing How It
Oversees the Pipeline Industry (2000) ‚http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=
162.140.64.21&filename=rc00128.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao
This
must-read 66-page report describes at length the shortcomings
of OPS at its lowest point of effectiveness in recent
years. The Bellingham WA and Carlsbad NM pipeline disasters
in 1999 and 2000, respectively, focused intense public
and official criticism on this troubled agency. This report
notes, for example, that OPS proposed fines in only four
percent of enforcement actions, that major pipeline accidents
increased during the 1990s, that it had failed to adopt
many NTSB recommendations and statutory requirements,
and that it was curtailing potentially helpful state involvement
in the program, among many criticisms. It includes a report
on the Bellingham disaster.
Trans-Alaska
Pipeline: Actions to Improve Safety Are Under Way (1995)
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.
140.64.21&filename=rc95162.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao
This
is a follow-up report on the efforts by the pipeline operator
and the Joint Pipeline Office that regulates to correct
more than 4,900 deficiencies found in two 1993 reviews,
such as electrical problems, inadequate maintenance, and
the quality program, and lack of coordination among the
five agencies in the JPO.
Trans-Alaska
Pipeline: Ensuring the Pipeline's Security (1991) -
http://161.203.16.4/t2pbat7/145408.pdf
This
briefing paper to Congress describes the security measures
taken by the pipeline operator and regulators to protect
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline from sabotage by terrorists
(during the first Gulf War) and found that they were generally
effective.
Trans-Alaska
Pipeline: Regulators Have Not Ensured That Government Requirements
Are Being Met (1991) - 00087
This
110-page report concluded that regulators at the five-agency
Joint Pipeline Office did not have a systematic, coordinated
program for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and instead relied
on the company to regulate itself. Regulators failed to
address corrosion problems, potential earthquake damage,
leak detection systems, and major spill response capabilities.
Coast
Guard: Oil Spills Continue Despite Waterfront Facility Inspection
Program (1991) - 00087
This
report noted that the lack of a defined role for the Coast
Guard or Environmental Protection Agency at waterfront
oil facilities resulted in the failure of any federal
agency to inspect the sometimes complex system of waterfront
intra-facility pipelines. This resulted in too many oil
spills, some of them huge, described here. The report
also notes that the Coast Guard had not reviewed spill
and leak records to determine where to concentrate inspection
and enforcement efforts.
Pollution
from Pipelines: DOT Lacks Prevention Program and Information
for Timely Response (1991) - 00086
This
report revealed that the OPS had never addressed environmental
protection in its pipeline regulations, only public safety.
Its regulations were designed to prevent fatalities, injuries
and property damage only, neglecting measures like more
frequent spacing of shutoff valves near water bodies to
limit environmental damage. It described how this neglect
led to a 567,000 gallon oil pipeline spill in New York
harbor because responders were unaware of an underwater
pipeline's location and could not shut down the flow of
oil for hours. It noted how there are no maps of the nation's
pipeline system available to regulators or emergency responders.
This report led Congress in 1992 to include environmental
protection in the OPS mission.
Pipeline
Safety: New Risk Assessment Program Could Help Evaluate
Inspection Cycle (1989) - 00087
This
report evaluates the OPS inspection program designed to
examine every regulated pipeline every 2-1/2 years, finding
that OPS did not have enough field inspectors to carry
out thorough inspections. It also finds that OPS inspectors
lacked the training and skills to use the agency's inspection
results system, that OPS headquarters had nobody to help
them, and that OPS managers did not allot enough time
per inspection to find problems.
Inland
Oil Spills: Stronger Regulation and Enforcement Needed to
Avoid Future Incidents (1989) - 00087
Requested
after an Ashland Oil storage tank collapsed and spilled
about one million gallons into the Monongahela River,
this report notes the lack of EPA regulation of aboveground
storage tanks, many of them connected to pipeline systems.
The
Department of Transportation's Recent Efforts to Strengthen
Pipeline Safety (1987) - 00087
Presented
as testimony at a Congressional hearing on the 1986 Williams
Pipeline explosion in Mounds View MN, this 14-page report
notes the lack of OPS interest in greater involvement
of state pipeline safety agencies, that OPS used a biased
methodology to conclude that the cost of increased inspections
wasn't worth the expected benefit, and that a similar
bias allowed OPS to conclude that the benefits of its
regulating pipeline-company owned storage tanks weren't
worth the cost.
Need
to Assess Federal Role in Regulating and Enforcing Pipeline
Safety (1984) - 00087
This
91-page report details the failure of OPS to inspect pipelines
and enforce regulations effectively, so that some pipelines
had been inspected only once in five years and some not
at all. Although state pipeline safety agencies could
help, OPS had no program to encourage their greater participation,
and several states were considering cutting back. It made
several key recommendations.
U.S.
Office of Pipeline Safety
Pipeline
Safety Regulations, 49 CFR Ch I Parts 190-199 (2002)
- http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_02/49cfrv3_02.html
Authorized
by the Pipeline Safety Act, OPS has developed these regulations,
which include industry codes by reference. Compared to
other environmental and safety codes, these regulations
are uniquely nonspecific, lax and permissive.
The
Pipeline Risk Management Demonstration Program: Public Meeting
Materials, New Orleans LA, January 28, 1997 (1997) -
00094
Billed
as a "public" meeting, it was instead a meeting
of industry and OPS and some state agency staff to present
OPS activities to develop the Risk Management Demonstration
Program to let selected pipeline operators ignore pipeline
regulations and follow their own standards. Unfortunately
for the public, OPS data are so inadequate and misleading
that it has no verifiable understanding of the risks it
seeks to manage.
U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act
(2000) - http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/hearin00.html
Chaired
by Sen. John McCain, R-AZ, this hearing heard from regulators,
the industry, and the public, including the parents of the
three children killed by the Olympic Pipeline explosion
in Bellingham WA in 1999. The linked file here consists
of prepared testimony only, and is not a transcript.
U.S.
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure
Hearing
on Reauthorization of the Office of Pipeline Safety
(2002) - http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway
/02-13-02/02-13-02memo.html#PURPOSE
This
subcommittee is one of two in the U.S. House with jurisdiction
over pipeline safety. This is a file of prepared statements
by witnesses, preceded by a summary of the rulemaking
activities of OPS and issues to be resolved in the reauthorization
bills under consideration. Having failed to enact a reauthorization
bill by the end of the 106th Congress in 2000,
this was the second attempt, which resulted in a compromise
in 2002.
Hearing
on Reauthorization of the Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquids
Pipeline Safety Program (1999) - http://www.house.gov/transportation/
This
subcommittee hearing excluded pipeline safety reformers
from its witness list in a brazen effort to draft a bill
that ignored safety and regulatory problems, despite the
fact that the Bellingham WA pipeline disaster had happened
barely six weeks earlier. However, NTSB chairman Jim Hall
was a ray of truth in that hearing, directly criticizing
OPS failures to regulate pipelines, stating that"
the current dismal record has continued far too long and
needs to be addressed immediately."
U.S.
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, House Committee on
Energy and Commerce
Hearing
on Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act
and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act (2002)
- http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=78508.
pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/107_house_hearings
This
subcommittee features the participation of Rep. John Dingell,
D-MI, who has championed pipeline safety reforms since
the 1980s. After the failure in 2000 to enact a pipeline
safety reauthorization bill favorable to the industry,
there was a greater willingness to seek a compromise.
The Pipeline Safety and Security Act of 2002 was essentially
a product of this subcommittee.
Hearing
on Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act
and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act (1999)
- http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21
&filename=55149.pdf&directory=/disk2/wais/data/106_house_hearings
Held
barely two years after passage of the 1996 reauthorization
bill, this was part of the attempt by pipeline industry-friendly
Congressional leaders in the 106th Congress
to draft and pass another bill favorable to the industry.
This effort derailed later in 1999 when the Bellingham
WA pipeline tragedy focused unwanted scrutiny on the problems
of both the industry and federal regulation. Pipeline
safety reformers managed to kill a last minute attempt
to pass a weak bill in 2000, leaving the task to the 107th
Congress.
U.S.
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce,
Hearing on Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Bills (H.R.
977, H.R. 1489, and H.R. 2201) (1991) - 00124
This
hearing was in preparation of the reauthorization act of
1992, which made some improvements in pipeline safety, most
notably the addition of environmental protection to the
mission of the OPS.
U.S.
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce and Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
Joint Hearing on Underwater Pipeline Safety Bills (H.R.
4478 and H.R. 4888) (1990) - 00124
The
hearing and bills were in response to the explosion in 1987
of a submerged natural gas pipeline struck by the fishing
vessel Northumberland, killing 11 crew members. The bills
sought to make pipeline owners in coastal waters improve
location markers and proper burial of pipelines, among other
measures.
U.S.
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, House Committee on
Public Works and Transportation,
Hearing on Pipeline Safety Bills (H.R. 977, H.R. 1480,
H.R. 2605 and H.R. 2836) (1991) - 00124
This
hearing was in preparation of the reauthorization act of
1992, which made some improvements in pipeline safety, most
notably the addition of environmental protection to the
mission of the OPS.
Washington
State Citizens Committee on Pipeline Safety,
July 26, 2002 Committee Report (2002) - http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webdocs.nsf/de53b07997
d108ea882563b50072c5b3/24648ee538d3b41488256c0200
81d712/$FILE/Committee%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf
Following
the 1999 Bellingham pipeline disaster, Washington State
took action to expand its state pipeline safety agency and
regulations and formed this citizens committee to provide
oversight and make recommendations, including significant
proposed changes to the federal Pipeline Safety Act.
Washington
State Governor's Fuel Accident Prevention and Response Team,
Final Report and Recommendations (1999) - http://www.governor.wa.gov/taskcomm/faprt/finalreport_.htm
Formed
only weeks after the 1999 Bellingham pipeline disaster by
Governor Locke, this team developed detail recommendations
for changes in federal legislation and regulations, state
regulation of oil pipelines, and expanded public education
and local government participation. It provides a useful
guide for what communities in other states should demand
for improved pipeline safety before, not after, other tragedies
happen.
Washington
State Utilities and Transportation Commission, Pipeline Safety
Section
Pipeline
Safety Laws, Regulations, and Rulemaking (2003) - http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webimage.nsf/3183343b012337b488
25669b0077676f/fe77af9aebda07b58825693e006195fe?OpenDocument
This
web page provides links to virtually everything a layperson
would need to know about state pipeline safety regulations
in Washington.
Interstate
Pipeline Transportation Agreements with U.S. Department
of Transportation (2000) - http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webimage.nsf/web+objects/
pipeline/$file/gas_pipeline_safety_program.pdf
Shamed
by the 1999 Bellingham WA pipeline tragedy and extensive
news coverage of its lax regulation of pipeline, OPS agreed
in 2000 to allow the Washington UTC to help regulate interstate
oil and natural gas pipelines in the state. This reversed
the OPS policy of the previous several years of de-certifying
state pipeline safety agencies to pare down the number
of participating states.
Whatcom
County (WA),
Ordinance continuing a moratorium on the acceptance of
Conditional use permit applications for regional transmission
pipelines of Petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas
(2001) - http://www.whatcomcounty.us/council/2001/Ord2001-050.pdf
This
ordinance continues the emergency moratorium first adopted
in 2001 for another 180 day to prohibit any application
for the siting or construction of any new oil or natural
gas transmission pipeline in unincorporated areas of the
county. Bellingham is located in Whatcom County.
Wisconsin
Public Service Commission,
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety in Wisconsin (1999) http://psc.wi.gov/consumer/brochure/document/5005B.pdf
This
brochure for the public outlines Wisconsin's natural gas
pipeline safety program.
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