RESEARCH MAIN

 

 

American Petroleum Institute, Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators: Recommended Practice 1162 (Working Draft) (2002) http://www.api.org/pipelinepublicawareness

This includes a working group's draft that is being reviewed by sponsoring industry groups for adoption as an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard and, upon adoption by OPS by reference, a part of pipeline safety regulations. The goal is improved effectiveness of such programs, which can help reduce accidents caused by outside damage to pipelines.

 

Association of Oil Pipe Lines, Preventing Outside Damage to Pipelines (2002) http://www.aopl.org/pubs/2002/Preventing%20Damage%20Final%20Aug%2028.pdf

This two-page fact sheet outlines the industry's support for one-call systems (for excavators to call before digging) and public education, but does not discuss state and local government land-use measures that could provide meaningful protection from encroachment by urban sprawl ‚ if the industry asked for them.

Charlotte County FL, Ordinance to Prohibit Construction or Use of a Fuel or Petroleum Pipeline or Transmission Line Within the Special Surface Water Protection Overlay District (1992) - 00123f

Opposed to the route of a proposed refined products pipeline near its drinking water reservoir, the county government adopted an ordinance prohibiting the construction of oil pipelines in its Special Surface Water Protection Overlay District.

 

City of Punta Gorda FL, Southwest Florida Pipeline Submittal Review (1996) - 00082

Opposed to the same proposed pipeline as above, the city government commissioned this study by an engineering consultant, which found that even a small leak could reach the drinking water reservoir and contaminate it.

 

Columbus (OH) Alive, Gagging on Oil? (2002) - http://www.stoppipeline.org/NewWeb/Gagging.htm

This article in the alternative weekly newspaper, Columbus Alive, describes the controversy about the routing of a proposed Marathon Ashland oil pipeline through a local park, in return for the company's donation of $200,000 to the park system.

 

Edison Township NJ, Ordinance Prohibiting Construction Encroachment on Underground Pipelines (1994) - 00123c

After the 1994 Texas Eastern natural gas pipeline explosion in Edison NJ, the township government enacted a required setback of 75 feet from an oil or natural gas pipeline for any new construction ‚ and 125 feet for any building or structure involving corrosive, toxic or combustible material.

 

Fairfax County VA

Fairfax County, Virginia: A Pipeline Safety Perspective (1994) - 00119

Based on its experiences in the 1993 Colonial Pipeline fuel oil spill into the Potomac River, this paper prepared for the 1994 National Pipeline Safety Summit spells out numerous regulatory shortcomings that still exist. It notes that OPS regulations for oil pipelines permit the thinnest pipe wall thickness of any of the major national piping codes; for example, minimum wall thickness for high-pressure oil pipelines is 0.337 inches, while high-pressure water pipelines must be at least 0.485 inches thick.

Zoning Ordinance Amendment, Out of Turn Comprehensive Plan Amendment, Subdivision Ordinance Amendment and Public Facilities Manual Amendment Re: Major Underground Pipeline Utilities (1995) - 00123b

Following the 1993 Colonial Pipeline fuel oil spill, the county government adopted land use regulations to protect pipelines from outside damage by this comprehensive plan amendment to limit develop some development on rights-of-way. However, the county did not adopt specific setback requirements.

Florida Alliance, Broward County (FL) Pipelines Inspection Report (1998) - 00096

This report by a South Florida pipeline safety organization documents in photographs and text the severe encroachment by residential, commercial and other development on oil and natural gas pipeline rights-of-way. It shows vividly how the neglect by government, industry and real estate developers allow construction in this highly-urbanized county to create public safety hazards without regard for the risks they pose.

 

Fulton County GA, Text of Amendment, Minutes of Meeting, and Adoption of Pipeline Easement Setback Standards (1999) - 00123a

This ordinance is unusual because the Fulton County (Atlanta) GA government enacted setback standards without experiencing a tragic pipeline accident, as happened in other localities. It prohibits construction of any building used by human occupancy within 40 feet of a pipeline easement ‚ and 125 feet for any building containing corrosive, toxic or combustible material. A transcript of the public hearing on the ordinance is attached which includes extensive objections by pipeline company executives and some property owners to the setbacks.

 

Gas Research Institute, A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas Associated with Natural Gas Pipelines (2000) - http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/p56/120467.pdf

This 20-page report by an industry-funded study institute determines that the heat intensity of a natural gas pipeline fire is a function of pipe diameter and operating pressure, and the damage it causes is a function of the time a person or structure is exposed to it. For gas pipelines operating from 600 to 1,200 psi, the burn area ranges from under 100 feet for a small diameter pipe to over 1,100 feet for a large diameter pipe. This implies the need for greater pipe wall thickness for greater prevention of ruptures and variable definitions of high-consequence areas.

 

IIII Inspections and Investigations

Site-Specific Risks, Deaths and Injuries: Proposed Pacific Pipeline in City of Los Angeles (1995) - 00120

This consultant report for the City of Los Angeles used OPS pipeline accident data to calculate that the proposed Pacific Pipeline would result in two deaths, six serious injuries, and about $17 million in property damage in its 50 years of operation on the 32 miles of pipeline in the city.

Standard of Care for Petroleum Pipelines in Developed Residential and Industrial Areas (1992) - 00072

Developed for a homeowner organization in Atlanta GA affected by two mainline refined products pipelines, this summary of standards outlines effective leak prevention standards and measures to limit the severity of oil spills.

 

Iowa Utilities Board, Instructions for County Inspectors: Pipeline Construction Projects- Statues, Rules and Responsibilities (2001) http://www.state.ia.us/government/com/util/Misc/InspectionManual.pdf

This spells out standards for restoring agricultural lands disturbed by pipeline construction so that the soil can be returned to its original productive use and that agricultural improvements, such as soil drainage systems, are repaired. Although the federal Pipeline Safety Act preempts states from regulating interstate pipeline design and construction, it leaves to states a few areas, such as land use.

 

Jefferson County FL, White Paper: Planning and Regulating Linear Transmission Corridors - Issues and Options (1992) - 00123d

Prepared by the county's land-use consultant during a controversy over a proposed Colonial Pipeline refined products pipeline in North Florida, this 23-page paper outlines such issues as routing criteria, land use designation, environmental and performance standards, jurisdictional issues, and adjacent land use compatibility. The county was considering establishing a "linear transmission corridor" for the proposed route, but sustained community opposition forced Colonial to abandon its plans in 1995.

Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington (Seattle)

Pipeline Safety Information for Local Governments (2002) - http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/PubSafe/pipesafety.aspx

This overview lists key documents (and on-line links) from federal and state regulations and local government model ordinances to industry information sources.

Model Setback and Depth Requirements Ordinance for Transmission Pipelines (2001) - http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/PubSafe/pipesetbackord.aspx

This model ordinance uses as an authority the GRI "Sizing High Consequence Areas" paper cited elsewhere here to require a minimum 50-foot setback for all new general residential, commercial and industrial buildings from a pipeline corridor ‚ and twice that distance for buildings used for public gathers, education, religious assemblies, and health services.

 

National Research Council, Pipelines and Public Safety: Damage Prevention, Land Use, and Emergency Preparedness (1988) - http://gulliver.trb.org/publications/sr/sr219/SR219_00.pdf

This landmark (but almost completely ignored) study documents the urgent need for state and local governments to use their land-use and building code authority to help protect pipeline rights of way from encroaching development and third-party damage. It provides detailed recommendations, including required setbacks for new construction and pipeline operator review of building and site plans. Although a participant in the development of the report, OPS never helped to encourage adoption of its sensible recommendations, even after the 1996 Pipeline Safety Act amendments directed OPS to disseminate the report. Its recommendations are still valid and needed today.

 

National Transportation Safety Board

Protecting Public Safety Through Excavation Damage Prevention (1997) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/SS9701.pdf

This 114-page NTSB safety study follows up on the 1994 Excavation Damage Prevention Workshop and finds that federal legislation then before Congress did not require states to have mandatory one-call notification systems for excavators, and that the industry seemed mostly interested in promotional campaigns for one-call systems. It notes that the pipeline industry's methods of finding exact locations are often inaccurate, and that directional drilling near other buried pipelines can cause undetected damage. It also stated that any study of outside damage is hindered by the inaccurate and incomplete OPS accident data.

Proceedings of the Excavation Damage Prevention Workshop (1994) ‚ 00068

This 211-page proceedings covers a two-day workshop of federal and state pipeline safety regulators and industry executives focused on one-call notification systems, which are not mandatory in many states or do not require participation by all underground utilities companies or public agencies.

 

New Jersey Institute of Technology, Safe Separation Distances From Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines (1999) ‚ 00102

Addressing the limited research on this subject, and lack of accurate accident data, this report developed formulae for estimating the burn radius for a gas pipeline rupture and ignition. Thermal radiation is the primary source of damage and loss of life, and its intensity and range depend on the affected pipe's diameter and operating pressure. The paper concludes that safe distances range from 195 feet to 1,200 feet for the majority of natural gas transmission pipelines. This implies that virtually all setback distances adopted by local governments are probably not enough to protect property and lives.

City of Redmond (WA), Ordinance to Adopt Policies Related to Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (2002) - http://www.ci.redmond.wa.us/insidecityhall/documentlibrary/pdfs/ORD2136.pdf

This requires use of one-call notification systems, participation by pipeline operators in all pre-construction meetings for new development within 150 feet of a pipeline corridor, and setbacks of new construction of at least 25 feet and 500 feet for schools, hospitals, nursing homes and similar facilities.

 

U.S. Minerals Management Service, Outer Continental Shelf Pipelines Crossing the Louisiana Coastal Zone: A Geographical Information System Approach Final Report (2002) - http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/studies/2002-038.pdf

This project assembled available digitized maps from 191 offshore pipeline operators to help provide an accurate inventory and location database for industry, regulators and others. However, it could not include unmapped pipelines, and other accuracy and compatibility problems limit its map information seriously. In other words, many pipelines remain unmapped and a continuing hazard to commercial and recreational boating, and virtually nothing is being done about it.

 

U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety

Required Submission of Data to the National Pipeline Mapping System Under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (2003) - http://ops.dot.gov/notices/Advisory_Bulletin/03-2449.pdf

This details what pipeline company mapping information is now required by the 2002 Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, replacing what was only a voluntary system developed by OPS. (This happened because Congress was shocked to learn that OPS does not have maps of all pipelines it regulates.) Unfortunately, the public cannot access the maps, even if they are property owners on or next to rights-of-way; they can only ask the OPS for contact information and then ask the company for information. By restricting what was once public information about pipeline locations, OPS believes that it is protecting us from terrorism, even though the greater threat to public safety is ignorance about pipeline locations and the outside damage accidents that happen as a result.

Strategies for Creating a National Pipeline Mapping System (undated) - http://www.bts.gov/gis/reference/npms_content

This web site details the strategy that resulted from a government and industry committee to develop standards and scope of a voluntary OPS mapping project for oil and natural gas pipelines. The maps would be compatible with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) programs, and OPS would maintain a clearinghouse for the system. However, until Congress made submitting mapping information mandatory in 2002, many pipeline companies did not participate.

 

Washington State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, Laws Relating to Energy Facilities Siting (2001) - http://www.efsec.wa.gov/FILES/rcw/80.50RCW2001.pdf

Among the energy facilities this siting regulation governs in Washington State are pipelines. It includes specific language that directs the council to give "appropriate weight" to city or county siting standards that protect sole source aquifers.

 

Whatcom County (WA), Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Background Report (2001) - http://www.mrsc.org/govdocs/W47pipelinerpt.pdf

Because the 1999 Bellingham WA pipeline tragedy happened in Whatcom County, this report examines the pipeline safety problem from a local government perspective and explores the feasibility of various local regulations to improve pipeline safety. These include franchise agreements, setback and other land-use requirements, one-call systems, improved communication with property owners and buyers, and restrictions on where new pipelines can be sited.

 

Wild Salmon Center, Pipeline-Stream Crossing Installations: Best Management Practices (2002) - http://www.wildsalmoncenter.org/pipeline-stream-english.pdf

These best management practices developed by this Oregon-based environmental organization seek to minimize the extensive environmental damage that pipeline construction across streams and rivers can cause, especially erosion and siltation.

Copyright © 2002 Pipeline Safety Foundation