RESEARCH
MAIN
City
of Bellingham,
Whatcom Creek Pipeline Incident (2002) - http://www.cob.org/whatcomcreek.htm
This
web page provides links to key documents about the 1999
Bellingham pipeline disaster by Olympic Pipeline that killed
three children.
City-County
Pipeline Safety Consortium of Washington State,
Report on Overview Assessment of 16-inch Diameter Olympic
Pipeline Integrity (2001) - http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/PubSafe/pipeeiber.pdf
This
expert consultant's report provided Washington local officials
with an independent assessment of the causes and impacts
of the 1999 Bellingham pipeline disaster.
Health
and Safety Executive (United Kingdom),
San Francisco Natural Gas Pipeline Puncture, August 25, 1981
(2000) - http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/land/comah/level3/5C9A309.HTM
This
one-page summary by a British government agency describes
a pipeline accident in San Francisco's financial district
that required evacuation of 30,000 people from an eight-block
area. It also presents issues raised by the accident and
response.
National
Response Center,
U.S. Coast Guard, National Response Team Incident Summaries,
2001-2003 (2003) - http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/insum.html
This
provides links to both combined and individual oil spill
data reported to the National Response Center, which is
usually the first federal agency to hear of an oil pipeline
accident. It shows an average of 1,747 pipeline accidents
were reported annually from 1991 to 2001 ó about ten times
the number reported to OPS in those same years ‚ illustrating
the gross underestimation of the problem reflected in the
OPS accident database.
National
Transportation Safety Board
Natural
Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire Near Carlsbad, New Mexico
August 19, 2000 (2003) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2003/PAR0301.pdf
This
60-page report describes one of the nation's worst natural
gas pipeline explosion, which killed a 12-person family
group camping overnight next to a corroded 50-year-old
El Paso Natural Gas line. The NTSB concluded that the
company's neglect of internal corrosion was the cause,
that it neither prevented nor detected the corrosion and,
in fact, has no internal corrosion control program for
its 10,000-mile pipeline system, and that OPS failed to
inspect this pipeline adequately. It also concluded, "The
current Federal pipeline safety regulations do not provide
adequate guidance to pipeline operators or enforcement
personnel in mitigating internal pipeline corrosion."
Pipeline
Rupture and Release of Gasoline, Olympic Pipeline Company,
Bellingham, Washington, June 10, 1999 (2002) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/PAR0202.pdf
This
88-page report describes the tragic explosion of Olympic's
gasoline pipeline that ruptured and ignited in a city
park, killing two 10-year-old boys and a 19-year-old man.
The NTSB concluded that the cause was Olympic's failure
to repair damage done to the pipe by a construction crew
five years earlier and to properly operate control and
shutoff valve systems, and OPS's inadequate safety standards.
Rupture
of Piney Point Oil Pipeline and Release of Fuel Oil Near
Chalk Point, Maryland (2002) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/PAR0201.pdf
This
62-page report describes a 140,400-gallon spill of fuel
oil into wetlands and the Patuxent River, which cost about
$71 million for response and cleanup, paid by operator
Potomac Electric Power Co. The NTSB faulted PEPCO for
failing to repair a buckled pipe that finally ruptured,
for a leak-detection system that failed to detect the
leak for six hours, and for failure to alert responders
to the magnitude of the spill, which resulted in unnecessary
environmental damage. It faulted the OPS for not having
standards for replacement of buckled pipe.
Natural
Gas Explosion and Fire, South Riding, Virginia, July 7,
1998 (2001) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/PAR0101.pdf
Inadequate
separation between a damaged electrical and natural gas
service line to a home caused the gas pipe to corrode
and leak gas, which exploded, destroying the home and
killing one occupant. The NTSB faulted inadequate separation
procedures, and noted that installing an excess flow valve
(a safety feature long-sought by the NTSB) would have
shut off the gas supply to the home and prevented the
fatal explosion.
Hazardous
Liquid Pipe Failure and Leak, Explorer Pipeline Company,
Greenville, Texas, March 9, 2000 (2001) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/PAB0103.pdf
This
rupture spilled an estimated 564,000 gallons of gasoline
into East Caddo Creek, reaching Lake Tawakoni, a major
water supply for the Dallas area, after heavy rains breached
responders' containment dams. The NTSB noted that the
pipe thickness was only 0.281 inches; it corroded and
ruptured where coatings had become wrinkled and torn.
"Smart pig" inspection devices in 1997 had not
detected the corrosion. Damage and cleanup costs were
$18 million.
Hazardous
Liquid Pipe Failure and Leak, Marathon Ashland Pipe Line,
LLC, Winchester, Kentucky, January 27, 2000 (2001) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/PAB0102.pdf
About
489,000 gallons of crude oil spilled from a rupture of
a dented pipe onto a golf course and creek. Ashland controllers
failed to understand monitor alarms and continued to start
and restart pumps and continued pumping for nearly three
hours. A 1997 "smart pig" inspection had spotted
the dent, but Ashland did not repair it, thinking it was
not serious. Pipe thickness was only 0.25 inches. Damage
and cleanup costs were $7.1 million (and record-high criminal
fines were levied in later court proceedings).
Hazardous
Liquid Petroleum Products Pipeline Rupture, Colonial Pipeline
Company, Knoxville, Tennessee, February 9, 1999 (2001) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/PAB0101.pdf
About
53,550 gallons of diesel fuel spilled from a crack caused
by a failed coating and reached the Tennessee River, which
had to be closed to navigation. Despite it being a small,
relatively low-pressure line, the volume was high because
Colonial Pipeline controllers in Atlanta stopped and restarted
the pipeline repeatedly for 4-1/2 hours until final shutdown.
NTSB investigators found that Colonial had not informed
nearby homeowners or the Knoxville Fire Department of
emergency notification procedures. Neither had Colonial
provided route maps to local responders, who were unaware
that the strong smell of fuel was coming from a pipeline.
Damage and cleanup costs were about $7 million.
Natural
Gas Service Line and Rupture and Subsequent Explosion and
Fire, Bridgeport, Alabama, January 22, 1999 (2000) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2000/PAB0001.pdf
Damaged
by a backhoe operator, a natural gas service line leaked
and exploded, destroying three small buildings, killing
four people and injuring five. The NTSB concluded that
the construction company had not followed safety and evacuation
procedures, and that city utilities staff had not followed
emergency response procedures. Damage costs were about
$1.4 million.
Natural
Gas Pipeline Rupture and Subsequent Explosion, St. Cloud,
Minnesota, December 11, 1998 (2000) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2000/PAR0001.pdf
While
installing a fiber-optic cable pole, excavators damaged
a natural gas service line, which leaked into nearby buildings
and exploded, killing four people and injuring 11 and
destroying six buildings. The NTSB faulted the excavators
for not immediately notifying 911 and local firefighters
for not evacuating people from the area and taking other
emergency precautions. It also noted that installing an
excess flow valve would have shut off the gas and prevented
its buildup and explosion. Property loss was an estimated
$399,000.
Hazardous
Liquid Petroleum Products Overpressure Rupture, Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, November 5, 1996 (1999) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/PAB9903.pdf
Because
of miscommunication, Colonial Pipeline controllers in
Atlanta began pumping diesel fuel toward Nashville, unaware
of a closed block valve in Murfreesboro, where extreme
overpressure ruptured the pipe, spilling 84,700 gallons.
They then failed to note the sharp drop in pressure in
the line and continued to pump for another hour. Colonial
recovered only a quarter of the fuel, which flowed into
sinkholes and small caverns and disappeared. The NTSB
cited inadequate training of control center staff and
a faulty monitoring system as underlying causes. Damage
costs were $5.7 million.
Pipeline
Rupture and Fire, Indianapolis, Indiana, July 21, 1997 (1999)
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/PAB9902.pdf
While
using directional drilling (instead of excavation) to
install a natural gas distribution line next to its gas
transmission line, Citizens Gas contractor failed to detect
that its drilling head had veered off course and damaged
the transmission line, which two months later ruptured
and exploded. One person died and one was injured, six
homes were destroyed and 65 others were significantly
damaged. Property damage was over $2 million. The NTSB
faulted Citizens Gas and its contractor for not taking
adequate precautions, such as drilling spot holes every
25 feet to ensure that the drill is on course.
Pipe
Failure and Leak, Morgan Falls Landfill, Sandy Springs,
Georgia, March 30, 1998 (1999) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/PAB9901.pdf
This
rupture that leaked some 30,000 gallons of gasoline in
a closed landfill near Atlanta was discovered by a bystander
whose call to Colonial Pipeline's emergency number was
routed to another office, delaying shutdown. No alarms
in Colonial's control center sounded. The gasoline almost
reached the Chattahoochee River, source of Atlanta's drinking
water. Incredibly, the pipeline had been built in 1978
through a then-active county-owned landfill, which closed
in 1987. The leak happened because a section of pipe buckled
and cracked after years of subsidence and compaction.
Ironically, a citizen's letter to her Congressman prompted
a visit to the landfill six months earlier by an OPS inspector,
who found no code violations.
Pipeline
Rupture, Liquid Butane Release and Fire Lively, Texas August
24, 1996 (1998) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/PAR9802S.pdf
Liquid
butane leaking from a corroded pipe created a butane vapor
cloud in a housing subdivision, which ignited and killed
two teenagers, also damaging several buildings. NTSB investigators
found that faulty coating tape and cathodic protection
had allowed the pipe to corrode undetected by Koch Pipeline.
They also found that public education had been cursory,
and residents were unaware of what to do when a leak occurs.
The NTSB recommended that OPS adopt stronger corrosion
protection requirements and public education program standards.
Pipeline
Rupture and Release of Fuel Oil in the Reedy River at Fork
Shoals, South Carolina June 26, 1996 (1998) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/PAR9801.pdf
One
of Colonial Pipeline's trunk lines ruptured and spilled
957,600 gallons of fuel oil into the Reedy River, causing
extensive environmental damage for 22 miles downstream.
The rupture of the corroded pipe happened when careless
starting and stopping at pumping stations along the line
created extreme pressures that burst the pipe. Cleanup
costs were over $14 million, and later civil and criminal
penalties added tens of millions more. NTSB cited Colonial
for failure to detect and repair corroded pipe and for
inadequate training and procedures for control room staff;
it recommended that OPS assess training and work scheduling
by operators.
Natural
Gas Pipeline Rupture and Fire During Dredging of Tiger Pass,
Louisiana October 23, 1996 (1998) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/PAR9801S.pdf
This
explosion happened when a dredge dropped a large steel
cylinder into the shallow waterway, unaware of a Tennessee
Gas line under it. The pipe ruptured and caught fire,
destroying the dredge and tugboat, but with no fatalities.
Because its remote monitors did not report the rupture,
it was two hours before controller shut down the pipeline.
NTSB faulted Tennessee Gas for not clearly marking its
submerged pipeline and maintaining an inadequate leak
monitoring system, and OPS for not requiring more visible
markers.
Release
of Hazardous Liquid Near Gramercy, Louisiana, May 23, 1996
(1998) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/PAB9801.pdf
Marathon
lost about 475,000 gallons of gasoline into a marshland
and river, causing extensive environmental damage. Its
controller at the company's operations center in Ohio
ignored repeated alarms for an hour that pressure had
dropped, believing it was due to routine activities, and
thus failed to prevent the huge loss. The NTSB found the
pipe had been damaged by another pipeline company excavating
in the common right-of- way and failed to notify Marathon
of the damage. Cost of the damages was about $7 million.
Fire
and Explosion, Midwest Gas Company, Waterloo, Iowa, October
17, 1994 (1998) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/PAB9802.pdf
This
natural gas service line explosion killed six persons
and injured six others, destroying one building. The cause
was the cracking of a polyethylene pipe damaged by use
of the surface area by heavy trucks. NTSB has questioned
the use of plastic pipe in many circumstances.
San
Juan Gas Company, Inc./Enron Corp. Propane Gas Explosion
in San Juan, Puerto Rico on November 21, 1996 [ALSO AVAILABLE
IN SPANISH] (1997)
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/PAR9701.pdf
A
propane gas line leaking in the basement of a department
store building exploded, killing 33 people and injuring
69. The dead included both employees of the stores and
bystanders on the street killed by flying debris. Damage
to the building was so severe that it was ordered demolished.
The NTSB called it the worst pipeline disaster in the
history of the agency. San Juan Gas, owned by Enron, had
received numerous complaints of gas odors for at least
a week before the explosion, but the gas company workers
failed to find and repair the leaks. The NTSB cited San
Juan Gas for this failure, as well as poor training and
supervision in identifying leaks. It cited Enron for failing
to manage San Juan Gas's program, Puerto Rico's Public
Service Commission for ineffective enforcement, and the
OPS for failing to monitor Puerto Rico's pipeline safety
program. In fact, OPS had given the program increasingly
high ratings in recent years.
Editor's
note: In response, the OPS not only took no enforcement
action, it contended that it was not a pipeline accident
and for several years did not include the accident in
its annual summary of accidents. Not only that, OPS soon
after selected Enron's Florida Gas Transmission Company
for its Risk Management Demonstration Project, a program
designed for pipeline companies with superior safety records.
UGI
Utilities, Inc., Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline Explosion
and Fire Allentown, Pennsylvania June 9, 1994 (1996)
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/PAR9601.pdf
Damaged
by excavators, a natural gas service line leaked gas into
the basement of an eight-story retirement home, where
it ignited, killing one person and inuring 66 others,
causing over $5 million in damage. The NTSB faulted the
excavation company for failing to notice and leak and
alert occupants of the building, the gas company for failing
to install excess flow shutoff valves (and OPS for refusing
to require them), and the State of Pennsylvania for its
inadequate damage-prevention program.
Evaluation
of Pipeline Failures During Flooding and of Spill Response
Actions, San Jacinto River Near Houston, Texas October 1994
(1996) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/SIR9604.pdf
Several
days of heavy rains and catastrophic flooding caused eight
oil pipelines to rupture and burn on October 19 and 20,
1994, spilling an estimated 2.5 million gallons (some
estimates are higher) of crude oil, refined products and
LP gas into the river and Galveston Bay. Companies involved
included Exxon, Colonial, Texaco and Valero. The surging
floodwaters had washed away soil over and under the pipelines,
exposing them to intense hydraulic pressures that bent
and twisted them until they burst. The fires caused extensive
damage of many structures that had survived the flooding
and injured some 1,831 people with mostly minor burns
or respiratory problems. The NTSB found fault with pipeline
design and construction standards in flood plains and
operating procedures. Despite the dramatic flood conditions,
most pipeline companies in the area, chiefly Colonial,
maintained normal pumping and took failed to shut down
and purge the lines, which would have sharply reduced
the severity of the spills. The NTSB faulted the OPS for
lax regulations about leak detection and shutdown standards.
Texas
Eastern Transmission Corporation Natural Gas Pipeline explosion
and Fire Edison, New Jersey March 23, 1994 (1995) -
00084
A
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. gas pipeline exploded
in flames next to an apartment complex in Edison NJ, sending
flames 400 to 500 feet in the air. Many of the 1,500 residents
had to flee on foot because intense heat from the fire
made the metal on their automobiles too hot to touch.
It destroyed or severely damaged 14 of the apartment buildings,
partly because the heat was too intense for fire trucks
to get close enough to suppress the fire. About 100 persons
were injured, mostly foot burns caused by the hot pavement
and cuts caused by flying glass shards. One woman with
a history of heart failure died of a heart attack. A gouge
in the pipe, probably a result of excavation equipment
years earlier, brittle pipe material, and excessive operating
pressures probably caused the rupture, according to the
NTSB. It also found fault with the lack of automatic or
remote-controlled shutoff valves; the manual valves were
difficult to reach and close, preventing operators from
promptly cutting off gas that fueled the fire, and that
Texas Eastern failed to adequate monitor excavation activity
on its right of way. The NTSB found that OPS regulatory
standards were lacking and called on local governments
to prevent dangerous encroachment on pipeline rights of
way.
Fire
on Board [mobile offshore drilling unit] ROWAN ODESSA, Gulf
of Mexico, December 1, 1994 (1996) - 00084f
While
positioning a mobile offshore drilling unit, workers struck
a submerged natural gas pipeline, which ruptured. The
rig manager realized what happened and ordered the 36
crewmembers to evacuate. While he was trying to move the
rig, the gas ignited and engulfing the rig in flames,
killing him, and causing $13 million in damages. The NTSB
criticized the lack of designated anchorages in the outer
continental shelf, lack of an inventory and maps of offshore
and onshore pipelines, and lack of regulations to require
them.
Liquid
Propane Pipeline Rupture and Fire, Texas Eastern Products
Pipeline Company, North Blenheim, New York, March 13, 1990
(1991) - 00084h
The
propane pipe ruptured inside a casing under a county road,
released about 1000,000 gallons of liquid propane, which
vaporized and flowed for about 21 hours downhill along
the road to the village of North Blenheim, where it ignited
and killed two people, injured seven others, and caused
over $4 million in damage. The NTSB faulted the company
for failing to train employees to identify pipe defects,
for rendering its alarm monitor unable to detect small,
steady leaks, and for taking more than an hour to shut
down the line after detecting the leak. The NTSB criticized
OPS for lax standards for pipeline employee training,
leak detection, spacing of shutdown valves, rapid shutdown
with remote-controlled valves, and education programs
for local emergency responders and the public.
Derailment
of Southern Pacific Freight Train on May 12, 1989 and Subsequent
Rupture of Calnev Petroleum Pipeline on May 25, 1989 in
San Bernardino, California (1990) ‚ 00079
The
Calnev pipeline which carries fuel between Las Vegas and
Los Angeles exploded in a fireball that killed three people,
injured 31 and destroyed part of a San Bernardino neighborhood
immediately adjacent to the pipeline. Thirteen days earlier,
the buried pipeline was damaged when a train derailed
and fell on top of it. Calnev hastily repaired it, government
regulators inspected it and found it safe, and began moving
the fuel again. However, undetected damage to the pipe
caused the pipeline to rupture 13 days later, which then
exploded. Instead of immediately shutting down, the Calnev
dispatcher misunderstood conditions and tried three times
to restart the pumps. Only after another operator saw
smoke rising did they realize what happened. An estimated
395,000 gallons of gasoline had escaped the pipeline,
in part because a check valve (to stop backflow) malfunctioned.
Pipe thickness was only 5/16th of an inch,
even though it was in a densely populated area and operating
pressure around 1600 pounds per square inch. After the
accident, city officials attempted to delay reopening
the pipeline until a thorough inspection could take place
and the pipeline moved further away from neighborhoods.
However, Calnev obtained an injunction, citing federal
preemption of state and local regulation of interstate
pipelines, and the flow of gasoline resumed on June 9,
barely two weeks after the tragedy.
Williams
Pipe Line Company Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Fire, Mounds
View, Minnesota, July 8, 1986 (1987) - 00084g
A
corroded weld seam in an electric resistance welded (ERW)
pipe ruptured, spilling about 30,000 gallons of gasoline
into a suburban neighborhood, where it flowed down and
street and ignited, killing two persons and seriously
burning another. NTSB criticized Williams for failing
to prevent or detect corrosion in ERW pipe susceptible
to failure, for being slow to close valves and locate
the leak, and inadequate training of personnel. It criticized
OPS for an inadequate inspection program, failure to levy
meaningful fines for violations, secret negotiations with
companies to return the line to service, inadequate staffing,
and several other deficiencies.
Williams
Pipe Line Company Gasoline Explosion and Fire, Roseville,
Minnesota, April 16, 1981 (1981) - 00084
Gasoline
sprayed from a fractured cast-iron base of a pipeline
booster pump and ignited, killing one person, injuring
three others and causing about $3 million in damage. The
NTSB criticized Williams for failing to test the 30-year-old
pump after it had been moved and installed at the station
and lack of training.
The
Pipelines of Puerto Rico Inc. Petroleum Products Rupture
and Fire, Bayamon, Puerto Rico, January 30, 1980 (1980)
- 00084
A
bulldozer working on a nearby water line ruptured a Shell
Oil gasoline pipeline, which sprayed downhill and into
a creek, igniting 1-1/2 hours later, killing one person
and extensively damaging 25 houses and other property.
The NTSB faulted Aqueduct and Sewer Authority and Highway
Authority officials for failing to locate the gasoline
pipeline and take precautions, and Shell for failing to
provide visible surface markers, and failing to notify
the National Response Center when the accident happened,
and Puerto Rico's Public Service Commission for lack of
training for inspectors and for emergency responders,
and failing to adopt a "one call" system.
Standard
Oil of Company of California Pipeline Rupture, Los Angeles,
California, June 16, 1976 (1976) - 00084a
Nine
people died and 14 were injured when a pipeline underneath
Venice Boulevard ruptured and sprayed gasoline, drenching
nearby buildings, before igniting. Unaware that a pipeline
was close to the surface, a road construction excavator
struck the pipeline. "As the flames enveloped the
block, persons were trapped in automobiles, pedestrians'
gasoline-drenched clothing ignited, and persons ‚ some
with their clothing on fire ‚ from inside the buildings
ran into the street," the report states. NTSB criticized
SOCAL for failing to identify the exact location and depth
of the line and to supervise the excavation, and California
for lack of guidelines for damage prevention during road
construction projects.
Colonial
Pipeline Company Petroleum Products Pipeline, Jacksonville,
Maryland, September 3, 1970 (1971) - 00084b
An
undetected pit of undetermined origin in one of Colonial's
trunk lines ruptured and slowly leaked some 30,000 gallons
of gasoline, which soaked the ground and later flowed
into a small creek, where residents reported the leak.
Colonial closed down the line and contractor crews attempted
to locate the leak and clean up the site. A day later,
the inexperienced crews accidentally ignited the gasoline,
which burned five persons. NTSB criticized Colonial for
failing to notice the pit (apparently there when installed),
for using monitors than could not detect small leaks,
unsafe working conditions, and lack of coordination with
local emergency responders. It criticized federal regulators
for vague standards for pipeline repairs.
The
New Yorker,
article about San Bernardino Pipeline Explosion (1990)
‚ 00080
Written
by New
Yorker writer George W. S. Trow for the October 22,
1990 issue, this is reporting at this best ‚ thorough, revealing,
poignant, and enraging ‚ about the 1989 railroad derailment
and later gasoline pipeline explosion that destroyed much
of a neighborhood and burned three people to death. It describes
careless railroad and pipeline operation and federal oversight
that cared more about keeping fuel flowing than protecting
the public.
U.S.
Coast Guard
Lookout
Mountain Pipeline Rupture, Chattanooga TN (1997) -
00125e
This
technical paper describes a Colonial Pipeline rupture
in 1996 that spilled about 65,000 gallons of kerosene-fuel
oil mix into the extensive limestone cave system of Lookout
Mountain managed by the National Park Service, where much
of it remains in the cave soils. It describes an extensive
cleanup and remediation effort. A national resource for
recreation and archeology, the cave system had to be closed
to spelunkers and others.
San
Jacinto River Incident: Armageddon Visits Houston (1997)
- 00125g
Potentially
18 million gallons of crude oil and refined products spilled
and exploded in the river during a historic flood from
October 13 to 19, 1994. (The companies reported only 1.2
million gallons spilled to OPS, a volume that remains
in its database.) The next day, "at least one major
pipeline ruptured and in three minutes most of the lower
San Jacinto River erupted in flames." Three other
pipelines also ruptured. It required over 1,500 response
personnel in a major test of the National Interagency
Incident Management System.
U.S.
Minerals Management Service,
Investigation of Chevron Pipe Line Company Pipeline Leak,
South Pass Block 38, September 29, 1998 (1999) - http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/acc_repo/99-0053.pdf
This
is an investigation report of a spill of an estimated 344,904
gallons of crude oil from an offshore pipeline damaged by
Hurricane George on September 28, 1998. After the hurricane
passed, Chevron resumed pumping through the pipe, unaware
that it had separated completely and was releasing all its
contents into the water for the next 25 hours. Investigators
found that Chevron had resumed pumping before restoring
its leak detection system and without communicating with
the receiving terminal, which could have alerted controllers
that no oil was being received. Unable to locate the break
in the pipeline, Chevron had to pressure test the pipe,
finding the break only when its helicopter pilot spotted
a new oil sheen made by a release of 3,570 more gallons
caused by the test.
U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Field Hearing on June 10, 1999 Olympic Pipe Line Accident
(1999) ‚ http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi
?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=78574.
pdf&directory=/disk2/wais/data/106_senate_hearings
Under
pressure from Senator Patty Murray of Washington, the committee
held a field hearing on the tragic Bellingham WA pipeline
explosion for fact gathering. This committee, chaired by
Senator John McCain of Arizona, later drafted amendments
to the Pipeline Safety Act, some of which became part of
the amendments enacted in 2002.
U.S.
Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public
Buildings, Hazardous Materials & Pipeline Transportation,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Hearing on the Bellingham WA Pipeline Explosion on June
10, 1999 (1999) - http://www.house.gov/transportation/
Held
in Washington DC, this hearing featured parents of the victims
of the Bellingham tragedy, as well as regulators, elected
officials, and pipeline company executives and their lobbyists.
This subcommittee was one of two House committees responsible
for pipeline safety legislation and participated in amendments
to the Pipeline Safety Act enacted in 2002.
U.S.
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee
on Public Works and Transportation
Colonial
Pipeline Rupture on March 23, 1993 at Herndon VA (1993)
- 00124
When
Colonial Pipeline spilled 408,000 gallons of fuel oil
in suburban Washington DC, which created a huge oil slick
on the Potomac River, it remained a front-page story for
weeks. Congress responded with this hearing, which cast
much-needed light on the need for stringent regulations
of pipelines. However, Republican victories in the 1994
election turned over control to a Congressional leadership
opposed to pipeline safety reforms, and the industry lobbyist-drafted
amendments enacted in 1996 seriously weakened federal
regulation.
Pipeline
Explosion on May 25, 1989 in San Bernardino CA (1989)
- 00124
This
field hearing in San Bernardino highlighted the lax industry
standards and lax regulation that led to this tragedy.
Although California strengthened its pipeline safety regulations,
Congress did little to solve the underlying problem of
lack of federal leadership.
Pipeline
Explosion on July 8, 1986 in Mounds View MN (1987) ‚
00124
This
hearing report provides great detail about the gasoline
pipeline explosion that damaged much of a suburban Minneapolis
neighborhood and killed one person.
Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission,
Information on Williams Gas Pipeline West Rupture (2003)
- http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webimage.nsf/d7506612dc95c
1928825657200770590/f658498d2f5a207888
256d1a0058cc3f!OpenDocument
This
fact sheet summarizes a natural gas explosion on May 1,
2003, near Auburn, Washington, and includes photographs
and a map.
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