RESEARCH MAIN

Alaska Forum for Environmental Responsibility

The Emperor's New Hose: How Big Oil Gets Rich Gambling with Alaska's Environment, A Status Report on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (2002) - http://www.alaskaforum.org/

Focusing on the five years since this organization's 1996 and 1997 status reports (below), this 163-page report describes accidents and operating problems and recommends adding safeguards to the renewal of the federal grant and state lease agreement for the next 30 years with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System owners.

 

Pipelines in Peril Update (1997) http://www.alaskaforum.org/

This updates the very detailed 1996 report of serious problems of the troubled Trans-Alaska Pipeline system. Despite several changes in the year covered, the company's "inability to fulfill its obligations to ensure safe oil transportation and effective spill response" continues to be troublesome for this aging system.

 

Pipeline in Peril: A Status Report on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (1996) - http://www.alaskaforum.org/

This 335-page report richly details problems, such as numerous spills and hazardous conditions, inadequate leak detection and shutoff valves, poor spill response performance, and harassment of whistleblower employees.    

 

American Petroleum Institute

Pipeline Environmental and Safety Initiative (2003) http://api-ep.api.org/industry/
index.cfm?objectid=902EA336-8C4B-4173-A32CBD525A3C9C4F&method=display_
body&er=1&bitmask=002007003001000000

A response to criticism of the pipeline industry, this brief statement of principles and strategy outlines the major tasks it intends to accomplish to make pipelines safer.

 

The Pipeline Performance Tracking System: More Detail, More Opportunities to Learn (2002) http://committees.api.org/pipeline/ppts/docs/lrnfin.pdf

This briefly describes the API's PPTS initiative to gather more accurate and comprehensive data on pipeline spills, especially smaller ones not reportable to the Office of Pipeline Safety. Although the data are submitted voluntarily by participating operators and are not specific to companies or open for independent verification, they could become a better measure of accident risks than the inadequate OPS database.

Small Spills: Limited Negative Impact but Many Opportunities to Learn and Thus Prevent (2002) http://committees.api.org/pipeline/ppts/docs/smspillsfinal.pdf

This describes how the PPTS data on all spills of five gallons or more (OPS until 2002 required reporting only spills of 2,100 gallons or more) provide a look at far more spills than currently compiled and thus better opportunities to learn from them about causes and effects.

 

Oil Pipeline Characteristics and Risk Factors: Illustrations from the Decade of Construction (2001) http://committees.api.org/pipeline/ppts/docs/decadefinal.pdf

While this paper draws flawed conclusions about accident rates from the unreliable OPS database, it provides useful information about the age of our national oil transmission pipelines system. For example, the 1950s and 60s were peak decades of construction, and two-thirds of all pipeline miles were built before 1970 (and nearly a quarter built before 1950), documenting the extent of our aging pipeline system.

 

Petroleum Industry Environmental Performance: Third Annual Report (1995) - 00038

Meant for readers outside the industry, this 64-page booklet concludes that there have been significant reductions in pipeline spills and leaks.

 

The Safety of Interstate Liquid Pipelines: An Evaluation of Present Levels and Proposals for Change (1987) - 00026

This 96-page document was especially useful to the industry by its self-serving calculations of the very high costs of safety improvements compared to the very low value of safety benefits they would achieve. It relies on OPS data on pipeline accident damage costs ‚ which ignored real costs and underreport actual accidents ‚ and inflated, unverifiable costs of improvements. Unfortunately, its calculations became the cost-benefit basis for OPS refusal to require safety improvements by the industry until recently.

 

Association of Oil Pipe Lines

The U.S. Oil Pipeline Industry's Safety Performance (2002) - http://www.aopl.org/news/2002/Safety%202002%20New.pdf

Although more detailed than earlier industry claims of its superior safety records, this 38-page AOPL study relies on OPS data notorious for undercounting the number and severity of actual pipeline accidents and their consequences.

Oil Pipeline Safety: A Research Update (2000) http://www.aopl.org/pubs/misc/safety_pipeline.pdf

This 16-page booklet summarizes several AOPL and API reports included here to claim a superior safety record, while also summarizing its claims of improved operations, leak detection and prevention, and spill response.

The Pipeline Safety Record, From the Data: Real Record of Pipeline Safety (1999) - http://www.aopl.org/pubs/misc/Record.pdf

This four-page document responds to Congressional testimony by the Environmental Defense Fund about how preventable pipeline spills and their consequences remain a serious problem requiring more stringent regulation.

The U.S. Oil Pipeline Industry's Safety Performance (1999) - 00052

This is an earlier version of the AOPL's 2002 safety performance report, with the same flawed data used selectively and misleadingly.

California State Fire Marshal

Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Risk Assessment (1993) - 00040

Although unfortunately limited to California pipeline accidents during the 1980s only, this report is thorough in gathering comprehensive accident data and analyzing them methodically. In exchange for confidentiality, the agency gathered full data from all crude oil and refined products operators, thus providing useful risk assessments not possible with OPS accident data. It illustrates what could and should be done on the federal level.

Risk Assessment of California Low-Pressure Crude Oil and Crude Oil Gathering Lines (1996) - 00001

This is an important study because it documents spills and leaks by crude oil pipelines that have been exempt from regulation by OPS. It shows that unregulated pipelines in California are just as likely to create pollution as regulated pipelines and that, based on these findings, the nation's some 60,000 miles of low-pressure and gathering lines should be regulated.

Cascade Columbia Alliance (WA)

Preventing Oil Leaks: A Citizens' Guide to Pipeline Safety (1996) - 00110

Published by an organization opposing the proposed Cross-Cascade Pipeline project (the proposal was withdrawn in 1999), this 30-page booklet details the measures a pipeline company can take to reduce the risk of leaks and spills, improve leak detection, and limit the damage that happens.

The Cross Cascade Pipeline Project Fact Book (excerpts)(1996) - 00113

This 69-page document summarizes a three-binder fact book of narrative and primary documents that describe the Cross-Cascade Pipeline project to carry refined products from northwest to southeast Washington State. Subjects include details about the project and the pipeline company partnership sponsoring it, their accident histories, causes of accidents, accident prevention and detections, federal and state regulation of pipelines, and others.

Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies, Crude Reckoning: The Impact of Petroleum on California's Public Health and Environment (2000) - http://www.ceert.org/pubs/crrp/petro/Reckoning.pdf

Published by a California environmental organization, this 62-page report covers a broad range of environmental problems caused by the oil and gas industry. Chapter 2 describes problems with pipelines and their lack of regulation.

City of Fredericksburg VA, Reducing the Risk of Oil Pipeline Accidents: The Virginia Experience (1996) - 00114

A paper delivered by City Attorney James Pates of Fredericksburg VA at an environmental symposium, this describes the number and severity of oil pipeline accidents nationally and in Virginia, with recommended state and federal regulatory improvements.

Cook Inlet Keepers, Lurking Below: Oil and Gas Pipeline Problems in the Cook Inlet Watershed (2002) - http://www.inletkeeper.org/pipelines.htm and http://www.inletkeeper.org/new%20pipelines%20page/reportcard.pdf

This environmental organization's report documents 66 pipeline spills (totaling over 250,000 gallons of oil) from 1997 to 2001 in this fragile watershed. Responsible for the top eight pipeline spills, Unocal had the worst record, yet received only a $5,000 fine during the five years.  

EFA Technologies Inc.

Pipeline Accident, Failure Probability Determined from Historical Data (1993) - 00064c

Accident data from 1982 to 1991 show that pipelines of short-to-moderate lengths (say, 50 miles) will have at least one federally reportable spill every 20 years, while longer pipelines (up to 1,000 miles) will have one per year. Using spill data from the Oil Spill Intelligence Report database, this article also finds that 52.5 percent of U.S. Alberta (Canada) spill data show three times the pipeline accident rate as OPS data, because it requires more and detailed reporting of spills, casting further doubt on the accuracy of OPS data.

Accident Frequency and Failure Probability of DOT Part 195 Pipelines from 1982 through 1992 (1993) - 00062b

Using OPS accident data for the years 1982 to 1991, this study contrasts their high probability and the rapidly rising costs of accidents with the pipeline industry's safety claims. "It appears the industry's assessment of pipeline accident risk is not based on factual data," the authors state.

Florida Alliance, Historical Perspective on the Environmental Impact of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipelines (1989) - 00137

Prepared by an organization opposing the conversion of a natural gas transmission product through most of Florida with a refined products pipeline in the 1980s, this is a lengthy compilation of newspaper articles and reports about pipeline accidents, lack of regulation and Florida's environmental vulnerability to spills and leaks.

Friends of the Earth, Crude Awakening: The Oil Mess in America (1994) - 00004

Over 300 pages, this book is an outstanding survey of environmental and safety problems created by America's oil and gas industry. Its chapter on oil pipelines is richly detailed and covers the subject well, including a list of major accidents from 1985 to 1993. It also proposes necessary regulatory improvements.

Gadsden (FL) United Inc.

Fact Book: Big Bend Pipeline and Terminal Company Project, Vol. I (1995) - 00095

The first of two large binders compiled by a north Florida community organization, this provides in-depth narrative and primary documents opposing a proposed Colonial Pipeline refined products pipeline and tank farm. It details why the Gadsden County Commission should reject the company's request for land-use changes permitting the pipeline route and tank farm site. The organization succeeded in forcing Colonial to abandon its plans.

Fact Book: Big Bend Pipeline and Terminal Company Project, Vol. II (1995) - 00097

The second of two large binders. See above.

Gas Research Institute, Topical Report: Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines ‚ Pipeline Integrity ‚ Prevention, Detection and Mitigation Practices (2000) - http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf58/120473_web.pdf

Submitted by the natural gas pipeline industry during rulemaking by OPS regarding pipeline integrity management, this 161-page report portrays improvements in safety performance. However, it is flawed by reliance on inadequate and inaccurate pipeline accident data compiled by OPS.

ICF Consulting Inc., Trends in Oil Spill Rates by Mode of Transportation (1995) - 00055 

Using pipeline spill data from the Oil Spill Intelligence Report, this paper provides one of the few reliable studies of comparative accident rates by pipelines, vessels, rail, and trucks. It finds that from 1978 to 1993, pipeline spills increased in number and severity, while tanker and barge spills decreased.

King County WA, Analysis of Proposed Cross Cascade Pipeline, Tidewater Barge Lines and Eastern Washington Petroleum Supply and Demand (1996) - 00115

This county staff report disputed Olympic Pipeline's claim that its proposed pipeline from northwest to southeast Washington State would improve oil transportation safety by replacing Tidewater Barge Co. (which uses the Columbia River) to carry fuel to that part of the state. It found that Olympic's record of spills and leaks far exceeded Tidewater's. Olympic abandoned is proposed project in 1999, after its pipeline explosion in Bellingham killed three victims.

Louisiana State University, Underwater Obstructions and Debris in Louisiana's Coastal Waters and the Gulf of Mexico: Issues and Strategies (1997)

http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/publications/online/obstructions_report.pdf

This 64-page report by LSU's Center for Energy Studies documents how thousands of miles of abandoned and active submerged oil and gas pipelines threaten the safety of commercial and recreational boaters, a problem worsened by coastal erosion and absence of maps that would show pipeline locations. It briefly describes several fatal boat accidents in recent years, including a natural gas pipeline struck by the fishing boat, Northumberland, which exploded and killed 11 crew members in 1989.

National Law Journal, Pipeline Perils: Fuel Leaks are Starting Fires ‚ and Plenty of Litigation (2002) - http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZ3S0XRI0D

This article describes the increasing number of successful lawsuits filed against pipeline companies because of accidents and hazardous conditions, including a $75 million settlement by Olympic Pipeline with the parents of two children killed by its pipeline exploding in 1999 in Bellingham WA. Factors include lax federal regulations, operator negligence, an aging pipeline system, and successful plaintiffs.

National Research Council, Improving the Safety of Marine Pipelines (1994) - 00037

This study contrasted the more thorough inspection and regulation of underwater oil and gas pipelines by the Minerals Management Service and OPS primarily in the Gulf of Mexico. It noted the inadequacy of OPS accident data, the fact that only one OPS field inspector was assigned to all Gulf pipelines, and other shortcomings. It recommended that MMS expand its role, replacing OPS.

National Response Center

U.S. Coast Guard, Oil and Hazardous Substances Incident: Incident Type Per Year, 1991-96 and 1997-2002 (2003) - http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/incident91-96.html and http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/incident97-02.html

These Coast Guard historical tables show that oil pipeline accidents are far more numerous than OPS accident data reveal.

Oil Spills in U.S. Waters 2000 (2001) ‚ http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/response/stats/chpt2000.pdf

This annual compilation of spills reported to the Coast Guard is the only timely annual report of pipeline safety available. While required by law to publish at least a biennial report on pipeline safety, OPS's most recent report is for 1995-96.

National Transportation Safety Board

Transportation Safety Database (2002) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/SR0202.pdf

This report on accident databases for all forms of transportation is the NTSB's most recent criticism of the OPS database of pipeline accidents, which, it concludes, is not adequate for accurate risk assessment programs. It notes that NTSB began recommending improved collection and compilation of adequate pipeline safety accident data in 1978, but that OPS failed to adopt any until 2002. Its recommendation was that the Bureau of Transportation Statistics develop a long-term program to improve risk data for all modes of transportation.

We Are All Safer (2001) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/SR9801.pdf

Aimed at the general public, this summarizes the duties and accomplishments of the NTSB during the 1990s, including its work on pipeline safety issues.

Speeches and Testimony on Pipeline Safety by Chairman Jim Hall (1997-99) - 00085

These three major speeches summarize the concern, high priority and actions for improved pipeline safety by Hall during his nearly six years as NTSB Chair. His plainspoken criticism of industry practices and support for reforms was a major factor for recent improvements.

Evaluation of Accident Data and Federal Oversight of Petroleum Product Pipelines (1996) http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1996/SIR9602.pdf

This report details the deficient OPS database for oil pipeline accidents and emphasizes the need for accurate, comprehensive data to identify accurate risk factor analyses and performance by individual operators. It notes that while OPS has emphasized prevention of excavation damage to pipelines, it has neglected other causes, such as corrosion.

New Jersey Institute of Technology

Pipeline Accident Effects for Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines (1996) - 00032

Congress commissioned this and the four accompanying NJIT reports after the Edison NJ natural gas pipeline explosion in 1994 to seek a better understanding of pipeline safety problems, and is the best single source, so far, of objective analysis of these problems. This report notes that OPS accident data lack enough detail to understand risk factors (e.g., "other" is the second leading cause of gas pipeline accidents).

Despite that limitation, it reached these conclusions:

• "Outside force" damage is the leading cause of accidents, aided by development encroachment and lack of cover due to soil erosion.
• Electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe used in the 1940s to 1970s "has a high rate of material failure."
• The older the pipe, the likelier will be an accident.

Pipeline Accident Effects for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (1996) - 00030

This NJIT report begins by noting "significant errors and omissions" in the OPS accident database; it sought to overcome these by incorporating accident data from other sources but stated, "The most important conclusion of this study is that there is need for better data."

Other conclusions were:

• Illustrating the sorry OPS data quality, "the most dominant category of causes of accidents during the first 20 years of pipeline is λother.'"
• The older a pipeline, the more accident-prone it is, which "may mean that there is a finite limit to the effectiveness of corrosion prevention measures."
• Quality control and installation of components such as valves, 0-rings, gaskets and nipples should be improved.

"Prevention programs such as one-call systems, line marking, and right-of-way patrolling seem to be deficient."

Pipeline Accident Consequences for Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquids Pipelines and Pipeline Accident Consequences Analysis Using GIS for Natural Gas and Hazardous Liquids Pipelines (1996) - 00033

This NJIT report examines the damage area affected by the explosive force of a natural gas pipeline rupture and the fire that can follow, showing that higher operating pressures increase the surrounding areas that are burned. For example, a rupture and fire on a pipe operating at 1,000 psi could burn everything as far as 600 feet away; a propane pipe accident could burn everything within 1,000 feet. However, liquid pipeline accident consequences are so variable that generalizing is not feasible. The study proposes the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping to assess and manage risks for vulnerable areas.

Pipeline Industry: Comparison of U.S. with Foreign Pipeline Land Use and Siting Standards and Maintenance, Rehabilitation and Retrofitting Policies and Practices (1996) - 00031

The first part of this NJIT report compares U.S. land-use and siting standards with those of Canada, the U.K., Australia, Germany and Japan. It finds their standards similar, with some differences, such as:

• Germany requires setbacks from pipelines, the distance depending on pipe diameter.
• While the U.S. leaves emergency shutoff valve spacing up to operators, other nations specify minimum spacing to some extent; Japan requires valves every kilometer.
• Australia sets design life standards for aging pipelines, require extensive testing and replacement of sections that fail; it also specifies wall thickness and depth of cover minimums to protect from outside damage.
• Instead of design life, the U.K. uses "fatigue life" which requires testing and replacement (if needed) after 15,000 "stress cycles" (from routine pressure surges).
• The second part summarizes, with little commentary, current industry practices and policies.

Pipeline Industry: Electronic Incident/Accident/Annual Report and Audit System (1997) - 00029

Emphasizing the need to improve OPS pipeline accident data, this NJIT report proposes a new reporting and audit system that would collect more useful information, detect internal inconsistencies, and yield information that would be more useful.

 

New Mexico Public Interest Research Group, Preventing Accidents: Improving Pipeline Safety in New Mexico (2001) - http://www.nmpirg.org/reports/report6_01.pdf

Oil pipelines in New Mexico leaked or spilled over 11 million gallons from 1985 to 2000, according to this 15-page report by the state's PIRG, published after the natural gas pipeline explosion near Carlsbad that killed 12 people in 2000. Among the regulatory shortcomings NM PIRG notes is the lack of a complete map of pipelines in New Mexico by either state or federal regulators.

 

Ohio Public Interest Research Group, Dirty Drilling: The Threat of Oil and Gas Drilling in Lake Erie (2002) - http://ohiopirg.org/reports/DirtyDrilling.pdf

In response to industry demands for oil and natural gas drilling in U.S. waters of Lake Erie, this report details the safety and environmental problems caused by such drilling in Canadian waters of that lake. The leading source of oil leaks in Canadian waters is from the over 1,000 miles of underwater pipelines, mostly commonly because of corrosion.

Oil & Gas Journal, Data from U.S. Pipeline Performance Tracking Begin to Yield Clearer Picture (2002) http://ogj.pennnet.com/articles/article_display.cfm?
Section=Archives&Article_Category=Feat&ARTICLE_
ID=161033&KEYWORD=cheryl%20trench&x=y

The revealing point in this article about the pipeline industry's Pipeline Performance Tracking System (by which operators are voluntarily reporting to API even small pipeline leaks or spills) is that farming is the biggest single source of third-party damage. Unfortunately, this and other findings are based on only three years of PPTS data.  

 

Oil Spill Intelligence Report

Estimating Cleanup Costs for Oil Spills (1999) -

Updating data from the 1994 on oil spill costs, and dealing only with cleanup expenses, this technical paper finds that costs continue to rise, that small spills are more expensive to clean up per volume, and that the average cost per tonne (a tonne is equal to 294 gallons) of oil spilled was $73,156.

Historical Overview of Oil Spills from All Sources (1960-1998) (1999) - http://www.environmental-research.com/site_files_base/publications/content_pdf/spill_statistics

Using its own database of worldwide oil spills since 1968, this technical paper shows that pipelines still consistently spill more oil than tankers and barges. It notes that international data on pipeline spills are relatively inaccessible. Pipeline leaks can go undetected for years, they are subject to less regulation than tankers and barges ("even in the U.S."), and there are no international funding mechanisms or conventions as with the international tanker trade.

White Paper: U.S. Averages 99 Land Pipeline Spills Per Year (1997) - 00048

This OSIR report finds that pipelines spilled 4.7 times more in volume than oil tankers and barges. It includes a state-by-state compilation and the finding that the leading cause of pipeline accidents is structural problems like corrosion and defective pipes (outside damage is the second leading cause, at 33 percent of spills).

International Oil Spill Statistics (1994-96) - 00051

These three annual reports detail the extent of oil spills in general and, more important, that pipelines account for most large spills (10,000 gallons or more) in the U.S. Although limited statistics about large oil spills, the OSIR database is the most useful in drawing relative spill rates by transportation modes.

The Financial Costs of Oil Spills (1994) - 00003

This 252-page book details the many cost components of an oil spill, from immediate cleanup to legal expenses, penalties, and damage settlements. It emphasizes that passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 greatly expanded financial liabilities for polluters, as has the public's lower tolerance for error.

The Planet, A National Problem (2000) - http://planet.wwu.edu/summer00/summer00_national.htm

This article details several major pipeline accidents in recent years, with comments from industry critics about the causes and needed solutions. The Planet is a student-published environmental magazine at Western Washington University in Bellingham.

 

Texas Tech University, State of the Art Analysis of Current Research Trends in Pipeline Safety (2001) -http://www.che.ttu.edu/faculty/wiesner/Publications/
State%20of%20the%20Art%20Analysis%20of%20
Current%20Research%20Trends%20in%20Pipeline%20Safety.pdf

This content analysis of pipeline safety professional literature from 1973 to 2000 finds the number of articles and books increasingly greatly, especially in recent years, reflecting a stronger interest in these issues. It helps identify such problems as rising costs of accidents, increasing encroachment on rights-of-way, aging pipeline infrastructure, public criticism of the pipeline industry, political pressures for stronger regulation, and others.

 

Toledo (OH) Blade

A Buried Web of Perils: Pipelines Link National and Are Largely Unnoticed ‚ Until Someone Dies (2002) - http://www.stoppipeline.org/

The first of a two-part newspaper investigative report details numerous natural gas and oil pipeline accidents, lax regulation, and a careless industry, with an emphasis on the potential dangers of the proposed Independence Pipeline in northwest Ohio.

Pipeline Risks, Concerns Run Deep: Watchdog Office, Legislative Efforts Called Too Tame by Some Critics (2002) - http://www.stoppipeline.org/

The second of this two-part newspaper investigative report.

U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Hazardous Liquid and Natural Gas Pipeline Safety and Property Damage Data (2002) http://www.bts.gov/publications/nts/html/table_02_46.html

This table summarizes OPS pipeline accident data from 1970 to the present, including fatalities, injuries, number of accidents, and property damage.

U.S. Coast Guard

Proceedings, 1997 International Oil Spill Conference (selected papers) (1997) - 00125a

This selection of 35 technical papers by various presenters discusses oil pipeline accidents, their effects, and related subjects.

Oil Spills in the Chesapeake Bay (1985-1994) (1997) - 00125f

This technical paper analyzing 3,651 Chesapeake oil spills of 75 or more gallons in the Marine Safety Information System database shows that the number of oil spills rose, that the average spill volume declined, and that pipelines were the largest single source of those spills (37 percent of the 1.3 million gallons spilled) in that period.

U.S. Department of Energy, Unregulated Potential Sources of Groundwater Contamination Involving the Transport and Storage of Liquid Fuels: Technical and Policy Issues (1989) - 00057

This EPA policy paper describes the lack of federal regulation of pipelines to protect groundwater, noting that OPS regulations aimed to protect public safety only, not the environment. It discusses the oil pipeline industry's lack of leak prevention and detection, and lack of shutoff valves to limit the volume of spills. (Although Congress mandated adding environmental protections to federal regulations in 1993, OPS failed to adopt any until 2001, and many shortcomings persist.)

U.S. Department of Transportation, National Pipeline Safety Summit (1994) - 00002

Convened in the wake of the 1994 Edison NJ natural gas pipeline explosion, this "summit" brought together regulators, pipeline executives, technical experts and local government and community experts. Most poignant are the written comments by the husband of the explosion's only fatality.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Sector Notebook Project: The Transportation Industry (1996) - 00058

The oil and natural gas pipeline chapter of this EPA report provides a succinct profile of the industry's operations, its pollution outputs and causes of accidents, prevention measures, regulation and enforcement, compliance history, and trade association activities.

U.S. Minerals Management Service

Brief Overview of Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Pipelines: Installation, Potential Impacts, and Mitigation Measures (2001) - http://www.mms.gov/itd/pubs/2001/2001-067.pdf

This paper describes how MMS and OPS share responsibilities for regulating offshore pipelines, how pipelines are installed and operated, their useful life (20-40 years), and potential environmental impacts from installation and spills.

Comparative Occurrence Rates for Offshore Oil Spills (1994) - 00060

This technical paper concludes that, while U.S. offshore oil platform spill rates (as a percentage of volumes produced) and tanker and barge spill rates fell from 1964 to 1992, the spill rate of offshore pipelines doubled to a rate three times that of platforms. It notes the high risk of pipeline spills from damage by vessel anchors, especially in shallow waters.

Proceedings of the International Workshop on Offshore Pipeline Safety (1991) - 00090

Texts of seven speeches, seven theme papers, and summaries of eight working group discussions comprise this 305-page document. The subject covered range from pipeline integrity and leak detection to storm effects and repair problems. This conference is typical of how regulators, industry executives and their private and academic consultants meet to discuss pipeline safety problems with the participation of environmental experts or state and local government officials experienced in the impacts of lax regulations and operations. There is little self-criticism evident in these discussions.

U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety

Annual Report on Pipeline Safety (1978-1996) ‚ 00005- 00023

These annual reports provide useful information about oil and natural gas pipeline accidents, enforcement, and other regulatory activities. However, OPS has historically issued them only grudgingly, and several years late, limiting their usefulness to both the industry and the public. By early 2003, the most recent report was for 1995-96.

Colonial Pipeline Task Force Final Report (1996) ‚ 00024

After decades of tolerating Colonial Pipeline's shameful record of negligence and accidents, many of them the nation's largest and most damaging ‚ and prodding by the NTSB, Congress and the public ‚ OPS finally decided to study this poster child of pipeline un-safety. The result is interesting and useful because of its thorough review of Colonial's accident record, operations, maintenance and training. For example, after a downsizing in 1994 to keep profits high, Colonial gutted its engineering services staff, so that nobody was analyzing submitted field data that could alert senior managers to potential safety problems.

Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission, Pipeline Safety Section, Natural Gas Leak History (2003) - http://www.wutc.wa.gov/webimage.nsf/
82aa8bbc115259b088256517005e6d8c/2
124646a14c305b7882567c10062b0bd!OpenDocument

This is a brief history of major natural gas pipeline leaks in the state from 1992 to 2001.

Washington Monthly, Lines of Fire: The only thing standing between you and a deadly oil pipeline accident is Washington's most hapless regulatory agency (2002) - http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/search#2002

This influential Washington magazine's investigative article is a fine examination of the regulatory failures that have led to tragic accidents.

Wilderness Society

100 Spills, 1,000 Excuses (1990) - 00065

Released a year after the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster, this report compiled the 100 worst oil spills in those 12 months. Oil pipelines accounted for 46 spills, tanker ships and barges 22, and storage tanks 16. Pipelines accounted for 51.6 percent of the spills, by volume.

Oil Spills: Just a Cost of Doing Business (1991) - 00065

Released a year after the first report, this compiled the 50 worst oil spills in one year, which include 15 pipeline spills. One pipeline accident spilled 1.6 million gallons of crude oil into the Prairie River near Grand Rapids MN, the largest oil spill in Minnesota history. The Wilderness Society stopped publishing this annual report after 1991, due to lack of funds.